U.S., Israel Discuss Triggers for Bombing Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure
Dec 28, 2011 4:45 AM EST
The Obama administration is trying to assure Israel privately that it would strike Iran militarily if Tehran’s nuclear program crosses certain “red lines”—while attempting to dissuade the Israelis from acting unilaterally. Eli Lake reports exclusively.
When Defense Secretary Leon Panetta opined earlier this month that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could “consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret,” the Israelis went ballistic behind the scenes. Michael Oren, Israel’s ambassador to Washington, lodged a formal diplomatic protest known as a demarche. And the White House was thrust into action, reassuring the Israelis that the administration had its own “red lines” that would trigger military action against Iran, and that there is no need for Jerusalem to act unilaterally.
Panetta’s seemingly innocent remarks on Dec. 2 triggered the latest drama in the tinder-box relationship that the Obama administration is trying to navigate with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. With Republicans lining up to court Jewish donors and voters in America in 2012, Obama faces a tricky election-year task of ensuring Iran doesn’t acquire a nuclear bomb on his watch while keeping the Israelis from launching a preemptive strike that could inflame an already teetering Middle East.
The stakes are immensely high, and the distrust that Israelis feel toward the president remains a complicating factor. Those sentiments were laid bare in a speech Netanyahu’s minister of strategic affairs, Moshe Ya’alon, gave on Christmas Eve in Jerusalem, in which he used Panetta’s remarks to cast doubt on the U.S.’s willingness to launch its own military strike.
Ya’alon told the Anglo-Likud, an organization within Netanyahu’s Likud party that caters to native English speakers, that the Western strategy to stop Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons must include four elements, with the last resort being a military strike.
“The fourth element of this combined strategy is the credible military strike,” Ya’alon said, according to a recording of the speech provided to The Daily Beast. “There is no credible military action when we hear leaders from the West, saying, ‘this is not a real option,’ saying, ‘the price of military action is too high.’”
US President Barack Obama shakes hands with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a bilateral meeting September 21, 2011 at the United Nations in New York City., Mandel Ngan, AFP / Getty Images
The lack of trust between the Israeli and American leaders on Iran has been a sub-rosa tension in the relationship since 2009. Three U.S. military officials confirm to The Daily Beast that analysts attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense are often revising estimates trying to predict what events in Iran would trigger Prime Minister Netanyahu to authorize a military attack on the country’s nuclear infrastructure. Despite repeated requests going back to 2009, Netanyahu’s government has not agreed to ask the United States for permission or give significant advanced warning of any pending strike.
The sensitive work of trying to get both allies on the same page intensified this month. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited Washington last week to go over Iran issues; and the undersecretary of state for political affairs, Wendy Sherman, and a special arms control adviser to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Robert Einhorn, were in Israel last week to discuss Iran as well. Panetta for his own part has revised his tone on the question of Iran’s nuclear program, telling CBS News last week that the United States was prepared to use force against Iran to stop the country from building a nuclear weapon.
The new diplomacy has prompted new conversations between the United States and Israel over what the triggers—called “red lines” in diplomatic parlance—would be to justify a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Matthew Kroenig, who served as special adviser on Iran to the Office of the Secretary of Defense between July 2010 and July 2011, offered some of the possible “red lines” for a military strike in a recent Foreign Affairs article he wrote. He argued that the U.S should attack Iran’s facilities if Iran expels international nuclear weapons inspectors, begins enriching its stockpiles of uranium to weapons-grade levels of 90 percent, or installs advanced centrifuges at its main uranium-enrichment facility in Qom.
In an interview with The Daily Beast, Kroenig also noted that Iran announced in 2009 that it was set to construct 10 new uranium enrichment sites. “I doubt they are building ten new sites, but I would be surprised if Iran was not racing to build some secret enrichment facilities,” Kroenig said. “Progress on new facilities would be a major factor in our assessment of Iran’s nuclear program and shape all aspects of our policy towards this including the decision to use force.”
www.rabbijonathanginsburg.info
Wednesday, December 28, 2011
Friday, December 16, 2011
Obama Incompetence on Iran and Russia
The wages of appeasement
By Charles Krauthammer, Thursday, December 15, 8:09 PM
“Ask Osama bin Laden . . . whether I engage in appeasement.”
— Barack Obama, Dec. 8
Fair enough. Barack Obama didn’t appease Osama bin Laden. He killed him. And for ordering the raid and taking the risk, Obama deserves credit. Credit for decisiveness and political courage.
However, the bin Laden case was no test of policy. No serious person of either party ever suggested negotiation or concession. Obama demonstrated decisiveness, but forgoing a non-option says nothing about the soundness of one’s foreign policy. That comes into play when there are choices to be made.
And here the story is different. Take Obama’s two major foreign policy initiatives — toward Russia and Iran.
The administration came into office determined to warm relations with Russia. It was called “reset,” an antidote to the “dangerous drift” (Vice President Biden’s phrase) in relations during the Bush years.
In fact, Bush’s increasing coolness toward Russia was grounded in certain unpleasant realities: growing Kremlin authoritarianism that was systematically dismantling a fledgling democracy; naked aggression against a small, vulnerable, pro-American state (Georgia); the drive to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in the near-abroad and; support, from Syria to Venezuela, of the world’s more ostentatiously anti-American regimes.
Unmoored from such inconvenient realities, Obama went about his reset. The signature decision was the abrupt cancellation of a Polish- and Czech-based U.S. missile defense system bitterly opposed by Moscow.
The cancellation deeply undercut two very pro-American allies who had aligned themselves with Washington in the face of both Russian threats and popular unease. Obama not only left them twisting in the wind, he showed the world that the Central Europeans’ hard-won independence was only partial and tentative. With American acquiescence, their ostensibly sovereign decisions were subject to a Russian veto.
This major concession, together with a New START treaty far more needed by Russia than America, was supposed to ease U.S.-Russia relations, assuage Russian opposition to missile defense and enlist its assistance in stopping Iran’s nuclear program.
Three years in, how is that reset working out? The Russians are back on the warpath about missile defense. They’re denouncing the watered-down Obama substitute. They threaten not only to target any Europe-based U.S. missile defenses but also to install offensive missiles in Kaliningrad. They threaten additionally to withdraw from START, which the administration had touted as a great foreign policy achievement.
As for assistance on Iran, Moscow has thwarted us at every turn, weakening or blocking resolution after resolution. And now, when even the International Atomic Energy Agency has testified to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Russia declares that it will oppose any new sanctions.
Finally, adding contempt to mere injury, Vladimir Putin responded to recent anti-government demonstrations by unleashing a crude Soviet-style attack on America as the secret power behind the protests. Putin personally accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of sending “a signal” that activated internal spies and other agents of imperial America.
Such are the wages of appeasement. Makes one pine for mere “drift.”
Even worse has been Obama’s vaunted “engagement” with Iran. He began his presidency apologetically acknowledging U.S. involvement in a coup that happened more than 50 years ago. He then offered bilateral negotiations that, predictably, failed miserably. Most egregiously, he adopted a studied and scandalous neutrality during the popular revolution of 2009, a near-miraculous opportunity — now lost — for regime change.
Obama imagined that his silver tongue and exquisite sensitivity to Islam would persuade the mullahs to give up their weapons program. Amazingly, they resisted his charms, choosing instead to become a nuclear power. The negotiations did nothing but confer legitimacy on the regime at its point of maximum vulnerability (and savagery), as well as give it time for further uranium enrichment and bomb development.
For his exertions, Obama earned (a) continued lethal Iranian assistance to guerrillas killing Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, (b) a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador by blowing up a Washington restaurant, (c) the announcement just this week by a member of parliament of Iranian naval exercises to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, and (d) undoubted Chinese and Russian access to a captured U.S. drone for the copying and countering of its high-tech secrets.
How did Obama answer that one?
On Monday, he politely asked for the drone back.
On Tuesday, with Putin-like contempt, Iran demanded that Obama apologize instead. “Obama begs Iran to give him back his toy plane,” reveled the semiofficial Fars News Agency.
Just a few hours earlier, Secretary Clinton asserted yet again that “we want to see the Iranians engage. . . . We are not giving up on it.”
Blessed are the cheek-turners. But do these people have no limit?
letters@charleskrauthammer.com
www.rabbijonathanginsburg.com
www.converttojudaism.net
By Charles Krauthammer, Thursday, December 15, 8:09 PM
“Ask Osama bin Laden . . . whether I engage in appeasement.”
— Barack Obama, Dec. 8
Fair enough. Barack Obama didn’t appease Osama bin Laden. He killed him. And for ordering the raid and taking the risk, Obama deserves credit. Credit for decisiveness and political courage.
However, the bin Laden case was no test of policy. No serious person of either party ever suggested negotiation or concession. Obama demonstrated decisiveness, but forgoing a non-option says nothing about the soundness of one’s foreign policy. That comes into play when there are choices to be made.
And here the story is different. Take Obama’s two major foreign policy initiatives — toward Russia and Iran.
The administration came into office determined to warm relations with Russia. It was called “reset,” an antidote to the “dangerous drift” (Vice President Biden’s phrase) in relations during the Bush years.
In fact, Bush’s increasing coolness toward Russia was grounded in certain unpleasant realities: growing Kremlin authoritarianism that was systematically dismantling a fledgling democracy; naked aggression against a small, vulnerable, pro-American state (Georgia); the drive to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in the near-abroad and; support, from Syria to Venezuela, of the world’s more ostentatiously anti-American regimes.
Unmoored from such inconvenient realities, Obama went about his reset. The signature decision was the abrupt cancellation of a Polish- and Czech-based U.S. missile defense system bitterly opposed by Moscow.
The cancellation deeply undercut two very pro-American allies who had aligned themselves with Washington in the face of both Russian threats and popular unease. Obama not only left them twisting in the wind, he showed the world that the Central Europeans’ hard-won independence was only partial and tentative. With American acquiescence, their ostensibly sovereign decisions were subject to a Russian veto.
This major concession, together with a New START treaty far more needed by Russia than America, was supposed to ease U.S.-Russia relations, assuage Russian opposition to missile defense and enlist its assistance in stopping Iran’s nuclear program.
Three years in, how is that reset working out? The Russians are back on the warpath about missile defense. They’re denouncing the watered-down Obama substitute. They threaten not only to target any Europe-based U.S. missile defenses but also to install offensive missiles in Kaliningrad. They threaten additionally to withdraw from START, which the administration had touted as a great foreign policy achievement.
As for assistance on Iran, Moscow has thwarted us at every turn, weakening or blocking resolution after resolution. And now, when even the International Atomic Energy Agency has testified to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Russia declares that it will oppose any new sanctions.
Finally, adding contempt to mere injury, Vladimir Putin responded to recent anti-government demonstrations by unleashing a crude Soviet-style attack on America as the secret power behind the protests. Putin personally accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of sending “a signal” that activated internal spies and other agents of imperial America.
Such are the wages of appeasement. Makes one pine for mere “drift.”
Even worse has been Obama’s vaunted “engagement” with Iran. He began his presidency apologetically acknowledging U.S. involvement in a coup that happened more than 50 years ago. He then offered bilateral negotiations that, predictably, failed miserably. Most egregiously, he adopted a studied and scandalous neutrality during the popular revolution of 2009, a near-miraculous opportunity — now lost — for regime change.
Obama imagined that his silver tongue and exquisite sensitivity to Islam would persuade the mullahs to give up their weapons program. Amazingly, they resisted his charms, choosing instead to become a nuclear power. The negotiations did nothing but confer legitimacy on the regime at its point of maximum vulnerability (and savagery), as well as give it time for further uranium enrichment and bomb development.
For his exertions, Obama earned (a) continued lethal Iranian assistance to guerrillas killing Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, (b) a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador by blowing up a Washington restaurant, (c) the announcement just this week by a member of parliament of Iranian naval exercises to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, and (d) undoubted Chinese and Russian access to a captured U.S. drone for the copying and countering of its high-tech secrets.
How did Obama answer that one?
On Monday, he politely asked for the drone back.
On Tuesday, with Putin-like contempt, Iran demanded that Obama apologize instead. “Obama begs Iran to give him back his toy plane,” reveled the semiofficial Fars News Agency.
Just a few hours earlier, Secretary Clinton asserted yet again that “we want to see the Iranians engage. . . . We are not giving up on it.”
Blessed are the cheek-turners. But do these people have no limit?
letters@charleskrauthammer.com
www.rabbijonathanginsburg.com
www.converttojudaism.net
Monday, December 12, 2011
Obama won't stop iran
World Jewish Digest
Despite maintaining a veneer of happy collaboration, Israeli officials are deeply unhappy with the Obama administration's approach to the Iranian nuclear program.
It has long been assumed by observers that this is the case, but thus far there has been no public confirmation of it. That changed on Sunday night, when officials speaking under the cover of anonymity told YNet that all is definitely not well behind the scenes.
"While the House of Representatives and the Senate are promoting (anti-Iran) legislation," said one of the officials,
the White House is operating according to an ideology which could be defined as "hesitant." The Iranian issue calls for a clear stance, but the administration has yet to take the necessary measures to significantly hurt the ayatollahs' regime.
Especially cutting was the officials' praise for the French and British governments, who normally tend to wait for American leadership on such issues as Iran. Instead, Israel appears to believe that the two leading nations of Europe are well out in front of the U.S.
"France and the UK," said one official, "have begun to act determinedly, while Obama's administration has yet to formulate a policy that is sufficiently severe."
Such criticism not only reinforces a longstanding impression of Obama as being soft on Iran and on foreign policy in general, something often described with the expression "leading from behind," but also rubs salt in the wound by praising French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has also criticized Obama on the Iran issue.
France has increasingly taken on a leadership role in regard to Western policy on the Middle East as America appears to be disengaging. Sarkozy lead the push for NATO intervention in the Libyan civil war, which eventually toppled the Qaddafi regime, and has been the leading European voice for a tougher policy toward Iranian nuclear ambitions.
Dan Shapiro, Obama's ambassador to Israel, sought to maintain the facade of a united front, saying, "There is no issue that we coordinate" with Israel "more closely on than Iran."
Such public reassurances are par for the course in international politics, but if the reports of Israel's behind the scenes sentiments are accurate, then it appears that the security and foreign policy establishments are beginning to give up on the possibility of U.S. resistance to Iranian nuclear ambitions, at least so long as Obama is president.
If this is so, then it is very likely that Israel is beginning to seriously consider its military options. Thus far, the possibility of U.S. intervention has stayed Israel's hand, given the obvious advantages America enjoys in a military conflict with Iran, however brief.
Now, however, the Jewish state may finally be losing patience with its closest ally.
Despite maintaining a veneer of happy collaboration, Israeli officials are deeply unhappy with the Obama administration's approach to the Iranian nuclear program.
It has long been assumed by observers that this is the case, but thus far there has been no public confirmation of it. That changed on Sunday night, when officials speaking under the cover of anonymity told YNet that all is definitely not well behind the scenes.
"While the House of Representatives and the Senate are promoting (anti-Iran) legislation," said one of the officials,
the White House is operating according to an ideology which could be defined as "hesitant." The Iranian issue calls for a clear stance, but the administration has yet to take the necessary measures to significantly hurt the ayatollahs' regime.
Especially cutting was the officials' praise for the French and British governments, who normally tend to wait for American leadership on such issues as Iran. Instead, Israel appears to believe that the two leading nations of Europe are well out in front of the U.S.
"France and the UK," said one official, "have begun to act determinedly, while Obama's administration has yet to formulate a policy that is sufficiently severe."
Such criticism not only reinforces a longstanding impression of Obama as being soft on Iran and on foreign policy in general, something often described with the expression "leading from behind," but also rubs salt in the wound by praising French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has also criticized Obama on the Iran issue.
France has increasingly taken on a leadership role in regard to Western policy on the Middle East as America appears to be disengaging. Sarkozy lead the push for NATO intervention in the Libyan civil war, which eventually toppled the Qaddafi regime, and has been the leading European voice for a tougher policy toward Iranian nuclear ambitions.
Dan Shapiro, Obama's ambassador to Israel, sought to maintain the facade of a united front, saying, "There is no issue that we coordinate" with Israel "more closely on than Iran."
Such public reassurances are par for the course in international politics, but if the reports of Israel's behind the scenes sentiments are accurate, then it appears that the security and foreign policy establishments are beginning to give up on the possibility of U.S. resistance to Iranian nuclear ambitions, at least so long as Obama is president.
If this is so, then it is very likely that Israel is beginning to seriously consider its military options. Thus far, the possibility of U.S. intervention has stayed Israel's hand, given the obvious advantages America enjoys in a military conflict with Iran, however brief.
Now, however, the Jewish state may finally be losing patience with its closest ally.
Sunday, December 11, 2011
Obama ok with iran nuclear bomb
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-iran-policy-shifts-to-containment/2011/12/09/gIQAUD8DjO_print.html
Obama’s Iran policy shifts to containment
By Michael Makovsky and Blaise Misztal, Published: December 9
As recent events underscore the growing Iranian nuclear threat, the Obama administration appears to be pivoting toward a policy of containment. The emphasis of its rhetoric has shifted from preventing an “unacceptable” nuclear Iran to “isolating” it. When coupled with recent weaker action against Iran, we fear it signals a tacit policy change.
A few days after his election, President Obama called a nuclear Iran “unacceptable.” In February 2009, he pledged “to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.” By the next year, after a first round of negotiations with Iran had failed and the United Nations and Congress passed tougher sanctions, that pledge had softened. “The United States,” Obama said in July 2010, is “determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.”
The administration did not dwell publicly on Iran until the Oct. 11 announcement that it foiled an Iranian terrorist plot on U.S. soil — against the Saudi ambassador — and the International Atomic Energy Agency presented damning evidence of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The president’s response, a Nov. 21 statement announcing new sanctions, marked another subtle, yet significant, rhetorical shift. It downgraded the Iranian threat from “unacceptable” to one of the several “highest national security priorities.” Obama concluded: “Iran has chosen the path of international isolation. . . . [T]he United States will continue to find ways . . . to isolate and increase the pressure upon the Iranian regime.” Yet isolation now appears a goal in its own right, uncoupled from the objective of preventing nuclear capabilities.
The same rhetoric was more explicit in a speech the next day by national security adviser Thomas Donilon. “Iran today,” he declared, “is fundamentally weaker, more isolated, more vulnerable and badly discredited than ever.” Left unsaid was that Iran’s nuclear program is more advanced, more capable and closer than ever to achieving nuclear weapons.
Despite citing Obama’s July 2010 speech, Donilon’s overwhelming theme was isolation. He used some form of the word “isolate” 17 times, “prevent” only three and “unacceptable” not once. Donilon’s thesis was: “We will continue to build a regional defense architecture that prevents Iran from threatening its neighbors. We will continue to deepen Iran’s isolation, regionally and globally.” Reminiscent of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2009 promise to extend a “defense umbrella” over Iran’s neighbors, Donilon’s comments reveal a focus on managing, rather than neutralizing, the Iranian threat.
Administration actions reflect this rhetorical shift. Initially, while pledging to prevent a nuclear Iran at all costs, the administration focused on diplomacy and then a dual-track approach, including sanctions. The latter reached its apogee in mid-2010 with tough U.S. and international sanctions. The administration has not sufficiently enforced these sanctions, nor pressed for full-fledged sanctions against Iran’s central bank, a move backed this month by all 100 senators. Faced with international resistance, the administration’s resolve weakened, and it failed to persuade China, Russia and other countries to support measures firm enough to potentially compel Iran to cease its nuclear program.
Moreover, the administration’s lack of support for a military option undermines its commitment to preventing a nuclear Iran and undercuts its ability to achieve broader international support for sanctions. Despite repeated assertions that they are keeping “all options on the table,” officials seem to be conditioning Americans to view the prospect of a military strike negatively. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and his predecessor, Robert Gates, have effectively ruled out U.S. military action by constantly highlighting its risks. Twice recently, Panetta emphasized a strike’s “unintended consequences.” He listed five categories of them in a Dec. 2 speech in which he also referred, many times, to some form of “isolation.” This suggests the administration isn’t prepared to prevent a nuclear Iran at all costs. Nor has it made any credible preparations, such as military exercises and deployments, for a strike.
The administration’s alternative to prevention — isolation — implies containment. But a nuclear Iran could not be contained as the Soviet Union was. Containment requires credibility, a resource United States will have drained if, after numerous warnings to the contrary, we permit Tehran to cross the nuclear threshold. And no matter how isolated, a nuclear Iran is likely to spark a destabilizing cascade of proliferation. Despite its own isolation, North Korea shares its nuclear technology. Iran might, too. Tehran’s enemies, led by Saudi Arabia, would seek safety behind their own nuclear deterrent. And Iran and Israel, as former defense undersecretary Eric Edelman has argued, would have incentives to initiate a nuclear first strike, potentially dragging the United States into the conflict. All this would severely diminish U.S. influence and drive up oil prices.
The Obama administration needs to regain its clarity and refocus its rhetoric and action toward preventing a nuclear Iran. It should do so, if necessary, by “all elements of American power.”
Michael Makovsky, a Pentagon official during the George W. Bush administration, directs the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Project, including its Iran initiative. Blaise Misztal is associate director of the center’s National Security Project.
Obama’s Iran policy shifts to containment
By Michael Makovsky and Blaise Misztal, Published: December 9
As recent events underscore the growing Iranian nuclear threat, the Obama administration appears to be pivoting toward a policy of containment. The emphasis of its rhetoric has shifted from preventing an “unacceptable” nuclear Iran to “isolating” it. When coupled with recent weaker action against Iran, we fear it signals a tacit policy change.
A few days after his election, President Obama called a nuclear Iran “unacceptable.” In February 2009, he pledged “to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.” By the next year, after a first round of negotiations with Iran had failed and the United Nations and Congress passed tougher sanctions, that pledge had softened. “The United States,” Obama said in July 2010, is “determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.”
The administration did not dwell publicly on Iran until the Oct. 11 announcement that it foiled an Iranian terrorist plot on U.S. soil — against the Saudi ambassador — and the International Atomic Energy Agency presented damning evidence of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The president’s response, a Nov. 21 statement announcing new sanctions, marked another subtle, yet significant, rhetorical shift. It downgraded the Iranian threat from “unacceptable” to one of the several “highest national security priorities.” Obama concluded: “Iran has chosen the path of international isolation. . . . [T]he United States will continue to find ways . . . to isolate and increase the pressure upon the Iranian regime.” Yet isolation now appears a goal in its own right, uncoupled from the objective of preventing nuclear capabilities.
The same rhetoric was more explicit in a speech the next day by national security adviser Thomas Donilon. “Iran today,” he declared, “is fundamentally weaker, more isolated, more vulnerable and badly discredited than ever.” Left unsaid was that Iran’s nuclear program is more advanced, more capable and closer than ever to achieving nuclear weapons.
Despite citing Obama’s July 2010 speech, Donilon’s overwhelming theme was isolation. He used some form of the word “isolate” 17 times, “prevent” only three and “unacceptable” not once. Donilon’s thesis was: “We will continue to build a regional defense architecture that prevents Iran from threatening its neighbors. We will continue to deepen Iran’s isolation, regionally and globally.” Reminiscent of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2009 promise to extend a “defense umbrella” over Iran’s neighbors, Donilon’s comments reveal a focus on managing, rather than neutralizing, the Iranian threat.
Administration actions reflect this rhetorical shift. Initially, while pledging to prevent a nuclear Iran at all costs, the administration focused on diplomacy and then a dual-track approach, including sanctions. The latter reached its apogee in mid-2010 with tough U.S. and international sanctions. The administration has not sufficiently enforced these sanctions, nor pressed for full-fledged sanctions against Iran’s central bank, a move backed this month by all 100 senators. Faced with international resistance, the administration’s resolve weakened, and it failed to persuade China, Russia and other countries to support measures firm enough to potentially compel Iran to cease its nuclear program.
Moreover, the administration’s lack of support for a military option undermines its commitment to preventing a nuclear Iran and undercuts its ability to achieve broader international support for sanctions. Despite repeated assertions that they are keeping “all options on the table,” officials seem to be conditioning Americans to view the prospect of a military strike negatively. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and his predecessor, Robert Gates, have effectively ruled out U.S. military action by constantly highlighting its risks. Twice recently, Panetta emphasized a strike’s “unintended consequences.” He listed five categories of them in a Dec. 2 speech in which he also referred, many times, to some form of “isolation.” This suggests the administration isn’t prepared to prevent a nuclear Iran at all costs. Nor has it made any credible preparations, such as military exercises and deployments, for a strike.
The administration’s alternative to prevention — isolation — implies containment. But a nuclear Iran could not be contained as the Soviet Union was. Containment requires credibility, a resource United States will have drained if, after numerous warnings to the contrary, we permit Tehran to cross the nuclear threshold. And no matter how isolated, a nuclear Iran is likely to spark a destabilizing cascade of proliferation. Despite its own isolation, North Korea shares its nuclear technology. Iran might, too. Tehran’s enemies, led by Saudi Arabia, would seek safety behind their own nuclear deterrent. And Iran and Israel, as former defense undersecretary Eric Edelman has argued, would have incentives to initiate a nuclear first strike, potentially dragging the United States into the conflict. All this would severely diminish U.S. influence and drive up oil prices.
The Obama administration needs to regain its clarity and refocus its rhetoric and action toward preventing a nuclear Iran. It should do so, if necessary, by “all elements of American power.”
Michael Makovsky, a Pentagon official during the George W. Bush administration, directs the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Project, including its Iran initiative. Blaise Misztal is associate director of the center’s National Security Project.
Friday, December 9, 2011
Obama urging US lawmakers to soften Iran sanctions'
Even if the committee passes the Kirk-Menendez amendment with the stiff penalties will the Obama administration even enforce the new round of sanctions? Recall, 80 Senators signed a letter calling out the lack of enforcement of existing sanctions regarding Iran.
http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=248396
'Obama urging US lawmakers to soften Iran sanctions'
By REUTERS
06/12/2011
Senator Mark Kirk, co-author of proposal approved 100-0 by Senate to penalize foreign financial institutions that do business with Iran's central bank, says Obama administration trying to undermine sanctions.
WASHINGTON - The Obama administration is urging US lawmakers to soften proposed sanctions targeting Iran's central bank, Senator Mark Kirk said on Tuesday.
Kirk, a Republican, is the co-author along with Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of a proposal to penalize foreign financial institutions that do business with Iran's central bank, the main conduit for its oil revenues.
The Senate approved the proposal last week 100-0 despite lobbying against it by Obama administration officials, who argued that threatening US allies might not be the best way to get cooperation in action against Iran.
A similar measure is pending in the House of Representatives; both chambers must agree on the same version before it can become law.
Kirk said on Tuesday that the administration had written to some lawmakers' offices and "proposed what they describe as technical fixes" to the Kirk-Menendez amendment.
But Kirk complained: "They are not technical fixes at all. They are meant to undermine the amendment." He and Menendez have written to fellow lawmakers as well, urging them to "stick with" the Senate-passed proposal, Kirk said at an event on Iran's nuclear program, sponsored by the conservative American Enterprise Institute think tank.
The United States and its western allies have supported multiple rounds of sanctions on Iran, seeking to persuade it to curtail its nuclear work. Washington suspects Tehran of using its civilian nuclear program to develop weapons, although Iran says its program is solely to produce electricity.
The Kirk-Menendez proposal would dissuade foreign banks from dealing with Iran's central bank by threatening to cut them off from the US financial system. The United States already bars its own banks from dealing with the Iranian central bank.
Last week, administration officials testified on Capitol Hill that they were indeed looking for more ways to sanction Iran's central bank, but in a calibrated manner, to avoid roiling oil markets or antagonizing allies.
A senior Senate Republican aide said the document that the administration sent to lawmakers' offices proposed lengthening, from 60 to 180 days, the grace period in the Kirk-Menendez proposal before sanctions would kick in for non-oil transactions with Iran's central bank.
The administration also sought to "water down the penalties" on foreign banks that do business with Iran's central bank, the Senate aide said. The administration favored imposing "strict conditions" on such foreign banks, rather than the all-out cutoff from the US financial system that is in the Kirk-Menendez amendment.
Kirk charged that the Obama administration was simply trying to find "a way out for the administration, to say that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable, but to take no effective action against the central paymaster" of the country's nuclear architecture.
The Kirk-Menendez proposal passed the Senate last Thursday as an amendment to a huge bill authorizing defense programs. A similar proposal to target Iran's central bank has passed a House committee and the House is expected to vote on it soon.
www.rabbijonathanginsburg.com
http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=248396
'Obama urging US lawmakers to soften Iran sanctions'
By REUTERS
06/12/2011
Senator Mark Kirk, co-author of proposal approved 100-0 by Senate to penalize foreign financial institutions that do business with Iran's central bank, says Obama administration trying to undermine sanctions.
WASHINGTON - The Obama administration is urging US lawmakers to soften proposed sanctions targeting Iran's central bank, Senator Mark Kirk said on Tuesday.
Kirk, a Republican, is the co-author along with Democratic Senator Robert Menendez of a proposal to penalize foreign financial institutions that do business with Iran's central bank, the main conduit for its oil revenues.
The Senate approved the proposal last week 100-0 despite lobbying against it by Obama administration officials, who argued that threatening US allies might not be the best way to get cooperation in action against Iran.
A similar measure is pending in the House of Representatives; both chambers must agree on the same version before it can become law.
Kirk said on Tuesday that the administration had written to some lawmakers' offices and "proposed what they describe as technical fixes" to the Kirk-Menendez amendment.
But Kirk complained: "They are not technical fixes at all. They are meant to undermine the amendment." He and Menendez have written to fellow lawmakers as well, urging them to "stick with" the Senate-passed proposal, Kirk said at an event on Iran's nuclear program, sponsored by the conservative American Enterprise Institute think tank.
The United States and its western allies have supported multiple rounds of sanctions on Iran, seeking to persuade it to curtail its nuclear work. Washington suspects Tehran of using its civilian nuclear program to develop weapons, although Iran says its program is solely to produce electricity.
The Kirk-Menendez proposal would dissuade foreign banks from dealing with Iran's central bank by threatening to cut them off from the US financial system. The United States already bars its own banks from dealing with the Iranian central bank.
Last week, administration officials testified on Capitol Hill that they were indeed looking for more ways to sanction Iran's central bank, but in a calibrated manner, to avoid roiling oil markets or antagonizing allies.
A senior Senate Republican aide said the document that the administration sent to lawmakers' offices proposed lengthening, from 60 to 180 days, the grace period in the Kirk-Menendez proposal before sanctions would kick in for non-oil transactions with Iran's central bank.
The administration also sought to "water down the penalties" on foreign banks that do business with Iran's central bank, the Senate aide said. The administration favored imposing "strict conditions" on such foreign banks, rather than the all-out cutoff from the US financial system that is in the Kirk-Menendez amendment.
Kirk charged that the Obama administration was simply trying to find "a way out for the administration, to say that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable, but to take no effective action against the central paymaster" of the country's nuclear architecture.
The Kirk-Menendez proposal passed the Senate last Thursday as an amendment to a huge bill authorizing defense programs. A similar proposal to target Iran's central bank has passed a House committee and the House is expected to vote on it soon.
www.rabbijonathanginsburg.com
Wrong signals to Iran
ttp://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-wrong-signals-to-iran/2011/12/06/gIQAvzNYgO_story.html?hpid=z3
The wrong signals to Iran
By Editorial Board, Thursday, December 8, 5:25 PM
IRAN HAS BEEN showing signs of increasing nervousness about the possibility that its nuclear program will come under attack by Israel or the United States. From the West’s point of view, this alarm is good: The more Iran worries about a military attack, the more likely it is to scale back its nuclear activity. The only occasion in which Tehran froze its weaponization program came immediately after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when it feared it might be the next American target. That’s why the Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, regularly repeats that “all options are on the table.”
What doesn’t make sense is a public spelling out of reasons against military action — like that delivered by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta last Friday before a U.S.-Israeli conference in Washington. Mr. Panetta said that a strike would “at best” slow down Iran’s program for “maybe one, possibly two years”; that “some of those targets are very difficult to get at”; that a now-isolated regime would be able to “reestablish itself” in the region; that the United States would be the target of Iranian retaliation; and that the global economy would be damaged.
Some of Mr. Panetta’s assumptions are debatable: For example, would Arab states — many of which have been quietly hoping for a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran — really rally behind a regime they regard as a deadly enemy? And if bombing destroyed thousands of Iranian centrifuges, which are manufactured from materials Tehran cannot easily acquire, would it really be so simple to rebuild?
But even if every point were true, there is no reason for the defense secretary to spell out such views in public. No doubt President Obama and the Israeli defense ministry are well aware of the Pentagon’s views, but alarmed Iranian leaders could well conclude that they have no reason for concern after all.
The public disparaging of the force option is not the administration’s only waffling signal to Tehran. Though Mr. Obama boasted Thursday that his administration has orchestrated “the toughest sanctions that Iran has ever experienced,” he is resisting pressure from allies such as France and from Congress to sanction the Iranian central bank. Last week the Senate passed 100-0 an amendment to the defense authorization bill that would sanction foreign banks that conduct transactions with the Iranian central bank, with an option for a postponement if the White House determines that the effect on the oil market would be too severe. The administration opposed the measure and is trying to narrow its scope in a conference committee.
Officials say they worry about the damage such sanctions could cause to the economy or to relations with allies such as South Korea and Japan. Iran, they argue, could end up benefiting if oil prices spike. While these are not unreasonable concerns, the administration’s stance resembles Mr. Panetta’s message. In effect, it is signaling that it is determined to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon — unless it means taking military or diplomatic risks, or paying an economic price.
www/rabbijonathanginsburg.com
The wrong signals to Iran
By Editorial Board, Thursday, December 8, 5:25 PM
IRAN HAS BEEN showing signs of increasing nervousness about the possibility that its nuclear program will come under attack by Israel or the United States. From the West’s point of view, this alarm is good: The more Iran worries about a military attack, the more likely it is to scale back its nuclear activity. The only occasion in which Tehran froze its weaponization program came immediately after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when it feared it might be the next American target. That’s why the Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, regularly repeats that “all options are on the table.”
What doesn’t make sense is a public spelling out of reasons against military action — like that delivered by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta last Friday before a U.S.-Israeli conference in Washington. Mr. Panetta said that a strike would “at best” slow down Iran’s program for “maybe one, possibly two years”; that “some of those targets are very difficult to get at”; that a now-isolated regime would be able to “reestablish itself” in the region; that the United States would be the target of Iranian retaliation; and that the global economy would be damaged.
Some of Mr. Panetta’s assumptions are debatable: For example, would Arab states — many of which have been quietly hoping for a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran — really rally behind a regime they regard as a deadly enemy? And if bombing destroyed thousands of Iranian centrifuges, which are manufactured from materials Tehran cannot easily acquire, would it really be so simple to rebuild?
But even if every point were true, there is no reason for the defense secretary to spell out such views in public. No doubt President Obama and the Israeli defense ministry are well aware of the Pentagon’s views, but alarmed Iranian leaders could well conclude that they have no reason for concern after all.
The public disparaging of the force option is not the administration’s only waffling signal to Tehran. Though Mr. Obama boasted Thursday that his administration has orchestrated “the toughest sanctions that Iran has ever experienced,” he is resisting pressure from allies such as France and from Congress to sanction the Iranian central bank. Last week the Senate passed 100-0 an amendment to the defense authorization bill that would sanction foreign banks that conduct transactions with the Iranian central bank, with an option for a postponement if the White House determines that the effect on the oil market would be too severe. The administration opposed the measure and is trying to narrow its scope in a conference committee.
Officials say they worry about the damage such sanctions could cause to the economy or to relations with allies such as South Korea and Japan. Iran, they argue, could end up benefiting if oil prices spike. While these are not unreasonable concerns, the administration’s stance resembles Mr. Panetta’s message. In effect, it is signaling that it is determined to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon — unless it means taking military or diplomatic risks, or paying an economic price.
www/rabbijonathanginsburg.com
Thursday, December 8, 2011
don't exaggerate danger of attack on Iran
Michael Singh in FP:
"Given the alarms that have increasingly been sounded in recent months about Iran's nuclear progress and furor over its alleged plotting to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington and the storming of the British embassy in Tehran, one might think that Iran's leaders would be worried about the prospect of a Western attack on their country. However, their remarks suggest just the opposite. In recent days, Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei has boasted of 'shatter(ing) the resolve' of the West, and the commander of Iran's paramilitary Basij forces -- who were responsible for the embassy rampage -- predicted that the U.S. would be too weak even to respond to an Iranian attack. Perhaps this is just bluster; however, U.S. officials have done little to dampen the regime's overweening self-confidence and the proclivity for escalation which is fueled by it.
While Obama administration officials continue to assert that the military option remains 'on the table' with respect to Iran, they have a counterproductive tendency to simultaneously undermine those assertions and thereby undermine our efforts to deter Iran and muster support for tougher sanctions. The latest disquisition on the inadvisability of military action came from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who on Friday described five reasons why the U.S. should not strike Iran. All of them were debatable. First, Panetta claimed that an attack might only set back the regime 'one, possibly two years' because 'some of [the nuclear] targets are very difficult to get at.' Putting aside the advisability of broadcasting the limits of our military capabilities to Iran and others, this analysis is questionable. Presumably Panetta is in a position to know whether it would actually be difficult to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities, though recent unexplained explosions such as the one which nearly obliterated an Iranian missile complex suggest they are vulnerable. In any case, even partial damage could be difficult for Iran to recover from quickly. Centrifuge manufacturing, for example, depends critically on specialized, hard-to-acquire components, which would make reconstituting the program difficult with vigorous sanctions enforcement.
Second, Panetta asserted that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would result in increased support for the regime in Iran and the region. However, it is far more likely that our Arab allies -- especially those in the Gulf, who see Iran as the chief threat to their security -- would at least privately cheer a successful attack. Among Muslim-majority populations, a mid-2010 Pew poll found that only in Pakistan is there majority support for Iran's nuclear program. In Iran itself, far from bolstering the regime an attack may undermine it. Khamenei himself recognized this recently, warning in a speech to the Iranian navy that two previous Iranian regimes -- the Qajars and Pahlavis -- had shown vulnerability in the face of foreign powers and had been swept aside as a result. Panetta's third, fourth, and fifth assertions all concerned Iranian retaliation -- that Iran would target U.S. ships and bases; that an attack would carry economic consequences, presumably because Iran would target oil shipping or seek to close the Strait of Hormuz; and that an attack would lead to Iranian escalation and a conflict that would 'consume the Middle East.' It is a risk of any military activity that one's adversary will retaliate; the question is how capable he is of doing so. While the threat posed by Iran and the uncertainties inherent to any conflict should not be discounted, neither should they be exaggerated." http://t.uani.com/tqz3Pb
"Given the alarms that have increasingly been sounded in recent months about Iran's nuclear progress and furor over its alleged plotting to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington and the storming of the British embassy in Tehran, one might think that Iran's leaders would be worried about the prospect of a Western attack on their country. However, their remarks suggest just the opposite. In recent days, Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei has boasted of 'shatter(ing) the resolve' of the West, and the commander of Iran's paramilitary Basij forces -- who were responsible for the embassy rampage -- predicted that the U.S. would be too weak even to respond to an Iranian attack. Perhaps this is just bluster; however, U.S. officials have done little to dampen the regime's overweening self-confidence and the proclivity for escalation which is fueled by it.
While Obama administration officials continue to assert that the military option remains 'on the table' with respect to Iran, they have a counterproductive tendency to simultaneously undermine those assertions and thereby undermine our efforts to deter Iran and muster support for tougher sanctions. The latest disquisition on the inadvisability of military action came from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who on Friday described five reasons why the U.S. should not strike Iran. All of them were debatable. First, Panetta claimed that an attack might only set back the regime 'one, possibly two years' because 'some of [the nuclear] targets are very difficult to get at.' Putting aside the advisability of broadcasting the limits of our military capabilities to Iran and others, this analysis is questionable. Presumably Panetta is in a position to know whether it would actually be difficult to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities, though recent unexplained explosions such as the one which nearly obliterated an Iranian missile complex suggest they are vulnerable. In any case, even partial damage could be difficult for Iran to recover from quickly. Centrifuge manufacturing, for example, depends critically on specialized, hard-to-acquire components, which would make reconstituting the program difficult with vigorous sanctions enforcement.
Second, Panetta asserted that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would result in increased support for the regime in Iran and the region. However, it is far more likely that our Arab allies -- especially those in the Gulf, who see Iran as the chief threat to their security -- would at least privately cheer a successful attack. Among Muslim-majority populations, a mid-2010 Pew poll found that only in Pakistan is there majority support for Iran's nuclear program. In Iran itself, far from bolstering the regime an attack may undermine it. Khamenei himself recognized this recently, warning in a speech to the Iranian navy that two previous Iranian regimes -- the Qajars and Pahlavis -- had shown vulnerability in the face of foreign powers and had been swept aside as a result. Panetta's third, fourth, and fifth assertions all concerned Iranian retaliation -- that Iran would target U.S. ships and bases; that an attack would carry economic consequences, presumably because Iran would target oil shipping or seek to close the Strait of Hormuz; and that an attack would lead to Iranian escalation and a conflict that would 'consume the Middle East.' It is a risk of any military activity that one's adversary will retaliate; the question is how capable he is of doing so. While the threat posed by Iran and the uncertainties inherent to any conflict should not be discounted, neither should they be exaggerated." http://t.uani.com/tqz3Pb
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